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Introduction 
 
The growing presence of modern terrorism on the Internet is at the nexus of two key 
trends: the democratization of communications driven by user-generated content on the 
Internet and the modern terrorists’ growing awareness of the Internet’s potential for their 
purposes. The Internet has long been a favorite tool of terrorists. Decentralized and providing 
almost perfect anonymity, the Internet cannot be subjected to control or restriction and allows 
access to anyone who wants it. Large and small terrorist groups have their own web sites and 
use this medium to spread propaganda, to raise funds and launder money, to recruit and train 
members, to communicate and conspire, and to plan and launch attacks. Al Qaeda, for 
example, now operates hundreds of web sites, and many more appear every year. Besides 
web sites, modern terrorists rely on e-mail, chatrooms, e-groups, forums, and virtual message 
boards, as well as resources like YouTube, Facebook, and Google Earth. 
Fighting online terrorism raises the issue of countermeasures and their cost. Since the 
advent of the Internet, counterterrorism and security services all over the world have seen the 
Internet as both a danger and a useful instrument. Official statements have warned us of the 
ability of modern terrorists to use the Internet both for global communications as well as for 
cyber-attacks on crucial facilities and infrastructure. Recently, many security services and 
agencies have begun focusing on monitoring the Internet, on tracking down the terrorists 
using it, and on learning from the terrorists’ Internet messages. These security services have 
made numerous attempts, some secret and some not, to apply various systems and defense 
mechanisms against terrorists on the Internet. We will review some of these efforts and then 
examine their cost in terms of civil liberties. 
The Theater of Terror Conceptualization 
From its early days, terror has combined psychological and theatrical aspects: the 
word ―terror‖ comes from the Latin word ―terrere‖ which means ―to frighten‖ or ―to scare.‖ 
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During the ―popular‖ phase of the French Revolution in September 1793, the ―Reign of 
Terror‖ was officially declared and activated, and 16,000 people were guillotined; but 
executions of those labeled ―internal enemies‖ of France took place throughout the country, 
and about 20,000 to 40,000 people were killed. Executions were conducted before large 
audiences and were accompanied by sensational publicity, thus spreading the intended fear. 
In the same way, but on a much larger scale, contemporary terrorists have new opportunities 
for exerting mass psychological impact as a result of technological advances in 
communications. During the 1970s, academic observers remarked increasingly on the 
theatrical proficiency with which terrorists conducted their operations. As Jenkins concluded 
his analysis of international terrorism, ―Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the 
actual victims. Terrorism is a theater.‖1 
Modern terrorism can be understood in terms of the production requirements of 
theatrical engagements. Terrorists pay attention to script preparation, cast selection, sets, 
props, role-playing, and minute-by-minute stage management. Just as compelling stage plays 
or ballet performances require full attention to detail, the media orientation in terrorism also 
requires full attention to detail to be effective. Terrorist theory gradually realized the potential 
of the mass media. Acts of terrorism were perceived more and more as means of persuasion 
and psychological warfare, in which the victim was ―the skin on a drum beaten to achieve a 
calculated impact on a wider audience.‖2 The most powerful and violent performance in the 
modern ―theater of terror‖ was the September 11, 2001 attack on American targets. Osama 
bin Laden discussed the twin attacks in November 2001. Referring to the suicide terrorists, 
whom he called ―vanguards of Islam,‖ bin Laden marveled: ―Those young men said in deeds, 
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in New York and Washington, speeches that overshadowed other speeches made everywhere 
else in the world. The speeches are understood by both Arabs and non-Arabs, even 
Chinese.‖3  
In her study The Terrorist Calculus Behind 9-11, Brigitte Nacos argued that bin 
Laden considered terrorism first and foremost as a vehicle to dispatch messages—―speeches‖ 
in bin Laden’s words. With respect to the events of September 11, 2001, specifically, bin 
Laden concluded that Americans in particular had heard and reacted to the intended 
communication.
4
 The psychological impact on the targeted population was not lost on bin 
Laden and his associates. In commenting on the impact of the terrorist attack on the 
American enemy, the al Qaeda leader remarked with obvious satisfaction, ―There is America, 
full of fear from north to south, from west to east. Thank God for that.‖ Moreover, Nacos 
argues that, by striking hard at America, the terrorists forced the media to explore al Qaeda 
grievances in ways that far transcended the quantity and narrow focus of the precrisis 
coverage of the terrorists’ grievances.5 Media coverage of Islam-related issues changed in a 
rather dramatic fashion after al Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, 2001, when the U.S. media 
tried to answer the question President Bush posed in his speech before a joint session of the 
U.S. Congress: ―Why do they hate us?‖ In the process, the perpetrators of the violence 
achieved perhaps their most important media-dependent goal—to publicize their causes, 
grievances, and demands. 
The Terrorist Production 
 The emergence of media-oriented terrorism led several communication and terrorism 
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scholars to reconceptualize modern terrorism within the framework of symbolic 
communication production: ―As a symbolic act, terrorism can be analyzed much like other 
mediums of communication, consisting of four basic components: transmitter (terrorist), 
intended recipient (target), message (bombing, ambush) and feedback (reaction of target 
audience).‖6 In fact, Ralph Dowling suggested applying the concept of ―rhetoric genre‖ to 
modern terrorism and argued that ―[t]errorists engage in recurrent rhetorical forms that force 
the media to provide the access without which terrorism could not fulfill its objectives.‖7 
Furthermore, some terrorist events have become ―terrorist spectaculars‖8 that can best be 
analyzed by ―media event‖ conceptualization.9  
 The growing importance of publicity and mass media to terrorist organizations is 
revealed both by the diffusion of media-oriented terrorist acts as well as by the tactics of 
more media-minded modern terrorists.
10
 It is clear that media-wise terrorists plan their 
actions with the media as a major consideration. They select targets, location, and timing 
according to media preferences, and try to satisfy the media’s criteria for newsworthiness, 
timetables, and deadlines. Terrorists prepare visuals for the media, such as video clips of their 
actions, taped interviews and declarations of the perpetrators, films, press releases (PRs), and 
video news releases (VNRs). Modern terrorists feed the media directly and indirectly with 
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propaganda material often disguised as news items. Terrorists also monitor the coverage of 
materials they provide to the media and examine closely various media organizations’ 
reports. Terrorists’ pressure on journalists takes many forms, from open and friendly hosting 
to direct threats, blackmail, and even murder of journalists. Finally, terrorist organizations 
may also operate their own media—television channels (Al-Manar of the Hezbollah), news 
agencies, newspapers and magazines, radio channels, video and audio cassettes, and, 
recently, web sites. 
The New Arena: Terror on the Internet 
Post-modern terrorists take advantage of the fruits of globalization and modern 
technology—especially the most advanced communication technologies—to plan, 
coordinate, and execute their deadly campaigns. No longer geographically constrained within 
a particular territory, or politically or financially dependent on a particular state, they rely on 
advanced communication such as the Internet. Terrorism and the Internet are related in two 
ways: First, the Internet is a forum for both terrorist groups and individual terrorists to spread 
their messages of hate and violence, to communicate with one another and with their 
supporters and sympathizers, and even to launch psychological warfare against their enemies. 
Second, individuals and groups attack computer networks, including those on the Internet, in 
what has become known as ―cyberterrorism‖ or ―cyberwarfare.‖ Currently, terrorists use and 
abuse the Internet for their own benefit more than they attack it. 
The network of computer-mediated communication (CMC) is ideal for terrorists-as-
communicators: it is decentralized, it cannot be subjected to control or restriction, it is not 
censored, and it allows free access to anyone. The structure of modern terrorist organizations 
makes computer-mediated communication even more important and useful for terrorists. The 
loosely knit network of cells, divisions, and subgroups typical to modern terrorists makes the 
Internet an ideal and necessary tool for inter- and intra-group networking. The rise of 
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virtually networked terrorist groups is part of a broader shift to what Arquilla and Ronfeldt 
have called ―Netwar‖: 
[N]etwar refers to an emerging mode of conflict and crime at societal levels, 
involving measures short of traditional war in which the protagonists . . . are 
likely to consist of dispersed, small groups who communicate, coordinate, and 
conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, without a precise central 
command. . . . [N]etwar differs from modes of conflict . . . in which the 
protagonists prefer formal, stand-alone, hierarchical organizations, doctrines, 
and strategies, as in past efforts, for example, to build centralized movements 
along Marxist lines.
11
 
Web sites are only one of the Internet’s services used by modern terrorists; there are 
many other facilities on the Internet—e-mail, chat rooms, e-groups, forums, virtual message 
boards—that terrorists use more and more. Many terrorist web sites are used for 
psychological campaigns against enemy states and their military forces. The verbal and 
graphic messages attempt to demoralize and scare the enemy or create feelings of guilt, 
doubt, and division. Terrorists use the Internet to post scary footage of executions, 
beheadings, fatal sniper attacks, and deadly bombings to frighten the enemy’s troops. They 
also use the Internet to deliver threats and messages to enemy governments and enemy 
populations.  The current literature offers anarray of works describing the ways that terrorists 
use the Internet.
12
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The Advantages of the Internet for Modern Terrorism 
 The great virtues of the Internet—ease of access, lack of regulation, vast potential 
audiences, fast flow of information, multimedia applications and so forth, have been 
converted to the advantage of groups committed to terrorizing societies to achieve their goals. 
The Internet takes very little skill to use, has few regulations, provides a worldwide audience 
to whom information can be sent quickly at a low cost, and allows for user anonymity.
13
 
These design elements allow terrorists to engage in their activities with minimal risks.
14
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 The anonymity offered by the Internet is very attractive for modern terrorists.
15
 The 
Internet provides this anonymity, as well as easy access from everywhere, and gives terrorists 
the option to post messages, e-mail, upload or download information—and disappear into the 
dark. When American forces in Afghanistan shut down al Qaeda’s camps, the terrorist group 
moved its base of operations to the Internet. The Internet has since become a valuable tool for 
al Qaeda, not just for coordination of operations and launching attacks, but also for virtual 
training camps, indoctrination, and recruitment. In reality, the Internet became for al Qaeda 
what experts call an ―online terrorism university.‖ More than 300 new pages of al Qaeda-
related manuals, instructions, and rhetoric are published on the Internet every month. ―It is 
not necessary . . . for you to join in a military training camp, or travel to another country . . . 
you can learn alone, or with other brothers, in [our online] preparation program,‖ announced 
al Qaeda leader Abu Hadschir Al Muqrin. 
 Paradoxically, the very decentralized network of communication that the U.S. security 
services created (out of fear of the Soviet Union), now serves the interests of the greatest foe 
of the West’s security services since the end of the Cold War—international terror. The 
modern Internet’s roots are to be found in the early 1970s, during the days of the Cold War, 
when the U.S. Department of Defense was concerned with reducing the vulnerability of its 
communication networks to nuclear attack. The Defense Department decided to decentralize 
the entire system by creating an interconnected web of computer networks. After twenty 
years of development and use by academic researchers, the Internet quickly expanded and 
changed its character when it was opened up to commercial users in the late 1980s. By the 
mid-1990s, the Internet connected more than 18,000 private, public, and national networks, 
with the number increasing daily. Hooked into those networks were about 3.2 million host 
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computers and perhaps as many as 60 million users spread across all seven continents. In 
2005, the Net passed a dramatic milestone: the one-billionth user went online. According to 
Morgan Stanley estimates, 36% of Internet users are now in Asia and 24% are in Europe. 
Only 23% of users are in North America, where the Internet started. It took thirty-six years 
for the Internet to get its first billion users. However, Internet use has grown by 18% per year; 
thus, in January 2009, the estimated population of Internet users was 1.5 billion. 
 CMC is ideal for terrorists-as-communicators, and modern terrorist groups take full 
advantage of the Internet for inter-group and intra-group networking.
16
 Al Qaeda, for 
example, has shown itself to be a remarkably nimble and adaptive entity, mainly due to its 
decentralized structure.
17
 By its very nature, the Internet is in many ways an ideal arena for 
the activities of terrorist organizations. Most notably, it offers: 
 Easy access; 
 Little or no regulation, censorship, or other forms of government control; 
 Potentially huge audiences spread throughout the world; 
 Anonymity of communication; 
 Fast flow of information; 
 Interactivity; 
 Inexpensive development and maintenance of a Web presence; 
 A multimedia environment (the ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and video 
and to allow users to download films, songs, books, posters, etc.); and 
 The ability to shape coverage in the traditional mass media, which increasingly use 
the Internet as a source for stories. 
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These advantages have not gone unnoticed by terrorist organizations, no matter what their 
political orientation. Islamists and Marxists, nationalists and separatists, fundamentalists and 
extremists, racists and anarchists: all find the Internet alluring. Today, all active terrorist 
organizations maintain web sites, and many maintain more than one web site and use several 
different languages. As the following illustrative list shows, these organizations and groups 
come from all corners of the globe and they all are active on the Net: 
 From the Middle East 
o Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) 
o Lebanese Hezbollah (Party of God) 
o Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades 
o Fatah Tanzim 
o Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
o Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
o Kahane Lives movement 
o People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI—Mujahedin-e Khalq) 
o Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) 
o Turkish-based Popular Democratic Liberation Front Party (DHKP/C) 
o Great East Islamic Raiders Front (IBDA-C) (which is also based in Turkey) 
 From Europe 
o Basque ETA movement 
o Armata Corsa (the Corsican Army) 
o Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) 
o Various groups associated wit al Qaeda 
 From Latin America 
o Peru’s Tupak-Amaru (MRTA) and Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) 
 12 
o Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN-Colombia) 
o Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
 From Asia 
o Al Qaeda 
o Japanese Supreme Truth (Aum Shinrikyo) 
o Ansar al Islam (Supporters of Islam) in Iraq 
o Japanese Red Army (JRA) 
o Hizb-ul Mujehideen in Kashmir 
o Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
o Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
o Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines 
o Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba 
o Rebel movement in Chechnya 
In July 2004, the independent National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States (the 9/11 Commission) released its findings in a 570-page report. The report 
points to the use of modern communication technologies for planning and execution of the 
9/11 attacks: ―Terrorists, in turn, have benefited from this same rapid development of 
communication technologies.‖ The importance of the Internet, and its uses by al Qaeda for 
the attacks, is also noted: 
 The emergence of the World Wide Web has given terrorists a much 
easier means of acquiring information and exercising command and control 
over their operations. The operational leader of the 9/11 conspiracy, 
Mohamed Atta, went online from Hamburg, Germany, to research U.S. 
flight schools. Targets of intelligence collection have become more 
sophisticated. These changes have made surveillance and threat warning 
more difficult.
18
 
 
The report highlights uses of the Internet by al Qaeda operatives, which include searching the 
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Web for information on U.S. flight schools, using Internet communications, equipping the 
hijackers with e-mail accounts, coordinating the attackers’ actions using e-mail, downloading 
anti-American Web pages, and gathering flight information.
19
 
Many terrorists on the Internet belong to radical Islamist groups and organizations. 
Paradoxically, it is those who criticize and attack Western modernity, technology, and media 
who use the West’s most advanced modern medium─the Internet. This should come as no 
surprise after the publication of several studies and especially Gary Bunt’s books Virtually 
Islamic, Islam in the Digital Age and iMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam. Bunt’s research 
is a detailed description of the diverse manifestations of the Islamic presence online. He 
suggests that there has been a significant redirection of resources into the Net by Islamic 
organizations that adapted to the digital age, preferring the Net over traditional channels of 
communication. This trend is reflected in the volume of militant Islamic materials online and 
in the growing sophistication of Islamic web sites. For example, the presentation of video 
clips and audio broadcasts on Islamic sites applies some of the most recent developments in 
computer technology.  
Bunt argues that ―[t]he Islamic Internet landscape changes frequently, with new sites 
emerging on a daily basis. Some very proactive players change their content and format 
regularly, attempting to draw readers to their message(s) in order to establish links or a sense 
of community.‖20 ―Chat rooms are often unregulated and unmonitored by scholars and 
clerics, can provide a virtual hangout for teenage and young-adult Muslims, and are 
sometimes rife with anti-kuffar (nonbeliever) sentiment.‖ Bunt concludes, ―The Internet is 
clearly important in disseminating a broad range of Islamic political-religious opinions and 
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concerns to a global audience. Thus, many extremist Islamist activists and terrorists now see 
the Internet as a vital tool.‖21  According to Bunt’s latest book, the internet has profoundly 
shaped how Muslims perceive Islam and how Islamic societies and networks evolve and shift 
in the twenty-first century.
22
 While these electronic interfaces appear new and innovative in 
terms of how media is applied, much of their content has a basis in classical Islamic concepts, 
with a historical resonance that can be traced back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Monitoring terrorist presence on the Internet reveals thousands of terrorist web sites. 
While in the late 1990s there were merely a dozen terrorist web sites, by the year 2000 
virtually all terrorist groups had established their presence on the Internet, and in 2003 there 
were over 2,600 terrorist web sites.
23
 This number rose dramatically, and by 2006 there were 
over 5,600 web sites serving terrorists and their supporters; recent estimates show close to 
8,000 web sites.
24
 
How Terrorists Use the Internet 
Today, all terrorist organizations, large and small, have their own web sites.
25
 They use 
this medium to spread propaganda, to raise funds, to launder money, to recruit and train 
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members, to communicate and conspire, and to launch attacks. Nevertheless, governments try 
to counter and catch modern terrorists using traditional means.
26
  
Terrorism and the Internet are related in several ways.
27
 At this point, terrorists use the 
Internet for propaganda and communication more than they attack the Internet. Yet, Frank 
Cilluffo of the Office of Homeland Security remarks, ―While bin Laden may have his finger 
on the trigger, his grandchildren may have their fingers on the computer mouse.‖ Future 
terrorists may indeed see greater potential for cyberterrorism than do the terrorists of today. 
Cyberterrorism may also become more attractive as the real and virtual worlds become more 
closely coupled. For instance, a terrorist group might simultaneously explode a bomb at a 
train station and launch a cyberattack on the communications infrastructure, thus magnifying 
the impact of the event. Unless these systems are carefully secured, conducting an online 
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operation that physically harms someone may be as easy tomorrow as penetrating a web site 
is today. 
Web sites are only one of the Internet’s services used by modern terrorism.28 For 
example, according to Katz and Devon: 
Yahoo! has become one of al Qaeda’s most significant ideological bases of 
operation. Utilizing several facets of Yahoo!’s service, including chat 
functions, e-mail, and most importantly, Yahoo! Groups, al Qaeda and its 
supporters have inserted themselves like a cancer into a company that screams, 
―American pop culture,‖ and made it as much their own as a training camp in 
Khost. . . . Creating a Yahoo! Group is free, quick, and extremely easy, and al 
Qaeda and its supporters have wasted no time in starting up several Yahoo! 
Groups with topics related to the terrorist group and the downfall of Western 
civilization. Very often, the groups contain the latest links to jihadist web 
sites, serving as a jihadist directory, and are sometimes the first to post al 
Qaeda communiqués to the public.
29
 
 
More recently, uploading, downloading, and viewing video has become very popular. 
YouTube was established in February 2005 as an online repository, facilitating the sharing of 
video content. YouTube claims to be the ―the world’s most popular online video 
community.‖  A 2007 report from the Pew Internet and American Life Project puts the 
percentage of U.S. online video viewers using YouTube at 27%, ahead of all other video 
sharing sites.
30
 In the 18-to-29-year-old age groups, this leadership is even more pronounced 
with 49% of U.S. online video viewers using YouTube.
31
 In fact, CNNMoney reported that in 
January 2008 alone, nearly 79 million users worldwide viewed more than 3 billion YouTube 
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videos.
32
 Terrorist groups realize the potential of this easily-accessed platform for the 
dissemination of their propaganda and radicalization videos. Convicted terrorist Younis 
Tsouli (―Irhabi007‖) praised the usefulness of this new online apparatus: ―A lot of the 
funding that the brothers are getting is coming because of the videos. Imagine how many 
have gone after seeing the videos. Imagine how many have become shahid [martyrs].‖  
 Hezbollah, Hamas, al Qaeda and its numerous affiliates, the LTTE, and the Shining 
Path of Peru all have propaganda videos on YouTube. In 2008, Hamas allegedly launched its 
own video-sharing web site, although the group denied ownership of the site. AqsaTube, in 
addition to having a similar name, was designed to look just like YouTube and even copied 
its logo. Once certain Internet providers refused to host the web site, Hamas launched a 
PaluTube and TubeZik, while the Tamil Tigers launched TamilTube. These videos are not 
just aimed at Middle Eastern Muslim youth. More recent videos posted on these video-
sharing web sites are dubbed in English or have English subtitles. 
 A recent study conducted by Conway and McInerney analyzed the online supporters 
of jihad-promoting video content on YouTube, focusing on postings and comments on 
martyr-promoting material from Iraq.
33
 The findings suggest that a majority of comments 
were posted by users under thirty-five years of age, residing outside the Middle East and 
North Africa; the largest percentage of supporters were located in the United States. The 
researchers concluded, 
What is clearly evident however is that jihadist content is spreading far 
beyond traditional jihadist web sites or even dedicated forums to embrace, in 
particular, video sharing and social networking—both hallmarks of Web 
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2.0—and thus extending their reach far beyond what may be conceived as 
their core support base in the Middle East and North Africa region to diaspora 
populations, converts, and political sympathizers.
34
 
 
Recent studies have identified numerous, albeit sometimes overlapping, ways in 
which contemporary terrorists use the Internet. Some of these ways parallel the uses to which 
everyone puts the Internet—information gathering, for instance. Some resemble the uses 
made of the medium by traditional political organizations, for example, raising funds and 
disseminating propaganda. Other ways, however, are much more unusual and distinctive, for 
instance, hiding instructions, manuals, and directions in coded messages or encrypted files. 
The various uses of the Net by modern terrorists may be grouped into two broad categories: 
communicative uses and instrumental uses. 
The Communicative Uses of the Internet by Terrorists 
The Internet has significantly expanded the opportunities for terrorists to secure 
publicity. Until the advent of the Internet, terrorists’ hopes of winning publicity for their 
causes and activities depended on attracting the attention of the television, radio, or print 
media. The fact that terrorists themselves have direct control over the content of their web 
sites offers further opportunity to shape how they are perceived by different target audiences 
and to manipulate their image and the images of their enemies. Most terrorist sites do not 
celebrate their violent activities. Instead—regardless of their nature, motives, or location—
most terrorist sites emphasize two issues: the restrictions placed on freedom of expression 
and the plight of their comrades who are political prisoners. These issues resonate powerfully 
with their own supporters and are calculated to elicit sympathy from Western audiences who 
cherish freedom of expression and who frown on measures taken to silence political 
opposition. 
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Common elements of terror sites include the organization’s communiqués and the 
speeches and writings of its leaders, founders, and ideologists. The sites often present a word-
for-word series of the organizations’ official statements, which the visitor can browse along 
with selected announcements arranged by date. The sites tend to recycle materials previously 
distributed through the mass media and other communication means. Some terrorist sites 
house a veritable online ―gift shop‖ through which visitors can order and purchase books, 
video and audiocassettes, stickers, printed shirts, and pins with the organization’s badges. 
Who are the targeted audiences of these sites? Do they appeal to current and potential 
supporters, to the international community, or to their enemies (namely, the public who is 
part of the opposing socio-political community in the conflict)? An analysis of the sites’ 
contents indicates an attempt to approach all three audiences.
35
 The slogans and text on these 
sites appeal strongly to the supporter-public. Of course, the sites in local languages 
(especially Arabic) target these audiences more directly than do the English and other-
language versions. These pages include detailed information about recent activities of the 
organizations and elaborate in detail about internal politics and relationships between local 
groups. Reaching out to supporters is also evinced from the fact that the sites offer 
appropriate items for sale, including printed shirts, badges, flags, and video- and 
audiocassettes. 
But an important target audience, in addition to supporters of the organizations, is the 
international ―bystander‖ public—surfers who are not involved in the conflict. This is evident 
from the presentation of basic information about the group, its leaders, and extensive 
historical background material (with which the supporter-public is presumably familiar). 
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Most of the sites offer versions in several languages in order to enlarge their international 
audience. The sites use English in addition to the local language of the organization’s 
supporters. Judging from the content of many of the sites, journalists might also constitute 
another ―bystander‖ target audience. The organizations often place press releases on the web 
sites. The detailed background information might also be useful for international reporters. 
Approaches to reaching enemy audiences are not as clearly apparent from the content 
of many sites. However, on some sites the desire to reach this audience is evidenced by 
efforts to demoralize the enemy or to create feelings of guilt. The Jihadists try to utilize their 
web sites to change public opinion in their enemies’ states, to weaken public support for the 
governing regime, to stimulate public debate, and, of course, to demoralize the enemy. They 
use the Internet to deliver threats and messages to enemy governments and to enemy 
populations. They can also use the Internet to harm the credibility of enemy media, enemy 
officials, and the establishment. In this case, the target audience is the enemy population, but 
the attack is on its official media credibility. 
The Internet also grants terrorists a cheap and efficient means of networking. Many 
terrorist groups, among them Hamas and al Qaeda, have transformed from strictly 
hierarchical organizations with designated leaders to affiliations of semi-independent cells 
that have no single commanding hierarchy. Through the Internet, these loosely 
interconnected groups are able to maintain contact with one another and with members of 
other terrorist groups. For instance, dozens of sites supporting terrorism in the name of jihad 
permit terrorists, in places as far-removed from one another as Chechnya and Malaysia, to 
exchange ideas and practical information about how to build bombs, establish terror cells, 
and carry out attacks.  
Modern terrorists’ use of the Internet is also a key ingredient in the concept of 
terrorism as psychological warfare. ―Cyber-fear,‖ argues Thomas,  
 21 
is generated by the fact that what a computer attack could do (i.e., bring down 
airliners, ruin critical infrastructure, destroy the stock market, reveal state 
secrets, etc.) is too often associated with what will happen . . . It is clear that 
the Internet empowers small groups and makes them appear much more 
capable than they might actually be, even turning bluster into a type of virtual 
fear. The net allows terrorists to amplify the consequences of their activities 
with follow-on messages and threats directly to the population at large, even 
though the terrorist group may be totally impotent. In effect, the Internet 
allows a person or group to appear to be larger or more important or 
threatening than they really are.
36
 
 
A terrifying example is the way in which Pakistani captors used the Internet to entrap Jewish-
American reporter Daniel Pearl through false e-mail communications, kidnapped and 
murdered him, and then posted the gruesome video on the Internet.
 
This pattern was later 
repeated by Abu Mussab al Zarqawi and the insurgents in Iraq who beheaded numerous 
hostages and posted the videotaped executions online. 
Practical Uses of the Internet by Terrorists 
In addition to communicative uses of the Internet, terrorists use the medium for 
instrumental purposes. The Internet may serve terrorists as an excellent source of useful 
information. The World Wide Web alone offers about a billion pages of information, much of 
it free—and much of it of interest to terrorist organizations. Terrorists, for instance, can learn 
from the Internet the schedules and locations of targets such as transportation facilities, 
nuclear power plants, public buildings, and airports and ports. They can even learn of 
counterterrorism measures taken in these places. Dan Verton, in his book Black Ice: The 
Invisible Threat of Cyberterrorism, explains that  
Al-Qaeda cells now operate with the assistance of large databases containing 
details of potential targets in the U.S. They use the Internet to collect 
intelligence on those targets, especially critical economic nodes, and modern 
software enables them to study structural weaknesses in facilities as well as 
predict the cascading failure effect of attacking certain systems.
37
 
 
Numerous tools are available to facilitate such data collection, often called 
                                                 
36
 Thomas, Al Qaeda and the Internet, supra note 12, at 112–23. 
37
 DAN VERTON, BLACK ICE: THE INVISIBLE THREAT OF CYBER-TERRORISM 109 (2003). 
 22 
datamining, including search engines, e-mail distribution lists, chat rooms, and discussion 
groups. Many web sites offer their own search tools for extracting information from 
databases on their sites. Word searches of online newspapers and journals can likewise 
generate useful information for terrorists; some of this information may also be available in 
the traditional media, but online searching capabilities allow terrorists to capture it 
anonymously and with very little effort or expense. According to former Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld, an al Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan tells its readers, 
―Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at 
least 80 percent of all information required about the enemy.‖ 
―Without recruitment terrorism cannot prevail, survive, and develop. Recruitment 
provides the killers, the suicide bombers, the kidnappers, the executioners, the engineers, and 
the soldiers—the armies of future terrorism. The Internet has become a useful instrument for 
modern terrorists’ recruitment.‖38 The Internet combines several advantages for the 
recruiters: it makes information gathering easier for potential recruits by offering more 
information, more quickly, and in multimedia format. The global reach of the Internet allows 
groups to publicize events to more people; and, by increasing the possibilities for interactive 
communication, the Internet offers new opportunities for assisting groups, along with more 
chances for contacting the group directly. Online recruitment by terrorist organizations is said 
to be widespread, though the Internet is used more for initial attraction, ideological 
recruitment, and social support than for direct recruitment. Moreover, the online process is 
more often activated to reward recruits and suicide terrorists, thus serving as an additional 
indirect recruitment initiative. Finally, terrorist recruiters may use interactive Internet 
technology to roam online chat rooms to look for receptive members of the public 
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(particularly young people) using sophisticated profiling procedures. 
Terrorists use the Internet to set up and activate virtual training camps; they use online 
communications to provide information to fellow terrorists, including maps, photographs, 
directions, codes, and technical details of how to use explosives.
39
 The Net is home to dozens 
of sites that provide information on how to build chemical and explosive weapons. Many of 
these sites post the Terrorist‟s Handbook and The Anarchist Cookbook, two well-known 
manuals that offer detailed instructions of how to construct a wide range of bombs. Another 
manual, The Mujahadeen Poisons Handbook, written by Abdel-Aziz and published on the 
official Hamas web site, details in twenty-three pages how to prepare various homemade 
poisons, poisonous gases, and other deadly materials for use in terrorist attacks. 
Terrorists use the Internet not only to learn how to build bombs and use arms, but also 
to plan and coordinate specific attacks. Al Qaeda operatives relied heavily on the Internet in 
planning and coordinating the September 11 attacks. Federal officials found thousands of 
encrypted messages that had been posted in a password-protected area of a web site on the 
computer of arrested al Qaeda terrorist Abu Zubaydah, who reportedly masterminded the 
attacks. The first messages found on Zubaydah’s computer were dated May 2001, and the last 
were sent on September 9, 2001. The frequency of the messages was highest in August 2001. 
To preserve their anonymity, the al Qaeda terrorists used the Internet in public places and 
sent messages via public e-mail. It is often simple to use the Internet in public facilities 
without being traced or identified; for example, at many public libraries, ―hawalas‖ 
(storefront money exchanges), or Internet cafes terrorists and their followers can access the 
Internet without presenting identification. 
Finally, like many other political organizations, terrorist groups use the Internet to 
raise funds. Al Qaeda, for instance, has always depended heavily on donations, and its global 
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fundraising network is built upon a foundation of charities, nongovernmental organizations, 
and other financial institutions that use web sites and Internet-based chat rooms and forums to 
solicit and gather funds. The fighters in the Russian breakaway republic of Chechnya have 
likewise used the Internet to publicize the numbers of bank accounts to which sympathizers 
can contribute. According to Thomas, the Internet is also used ―to put together profiles‖; 
Internet user demographics (culled, for instance, from personal information entered on online 
questionnaires and order forms) allow terrorists to identify users who have sympathy for a 
particular cause or issue.
40
 These individuals are then asked to make donations, typically 
through e-mails sent by a front group (i.e., an organization broadly supportive of the 
terrorists’ aims but operating publicly and legally and usually having no direct ties to the 
terrorist organization). 
Cyberterrorism 
The threat posed by cyberterrorism has grabbed the attention of the mass media, the 
security community, and the information technology industry. Journalists, politicians, and 
experts in a variety of fields have popularized a scenario in which sophisticated 
cyberterrorists electronically break into computers that control dams or air traffic control 
systems, thus wreaking havoc and endangering not only millions of lives, but national 
security itself. Because most critical infrastructure in Western societies is networked through 
computers, the potential threat from cyberterrorism is, to be sure, very alarming. Hackers, 
although not motivated by the same goals that inspire terrorists, have demonstrated that 
individuals can gain access to sensitive information and to the operation of crucial services. 
At least in theory, terrorists could thus follow the hackers’ lead and then, having broken into 
government and private computer systems, cripple or disable the military, financial, and 
service sectors of advanced economies. The growing dependence of our societies on 
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information technology has created a new form of vulnerability by giving terrorists the 
chance to approach targets that would otherwise be utterly unassailable, such as national 
defense systems and air traffic control systems. The more technologically developed a 
country is, the more vulnerable it becomes to cyberattacks against its infrastructure. 
What should be considered as cyberterrorism? Dorothy Denning has put forward an 
unambiguous definition in numerous articles: 
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It refers to 
unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks and the 
information stored therein that are carried out to intimidate or coerce a 
country’s government or citizens in furtherance of political or social 
objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in 
violence against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to 
generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, or 
severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against crucial 
infrastructures could count as acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their 
impact. Attacks that disrupt non-essential services or that are mainly a 
costly nuisance would not.
41
 
 
It is important to distinguish between cyberterrorism, hacking, and ―hacktivism‖—a 
term coined by scholars to describe the marriage of hacking and political activism. 
Hacktivism, although politically motivated, does not constitute cyberterrorism. Hacktivists 
want to protest and disrupt; they do not want to kill, maim, or terrorize. However, hacktivism 
does highlight the threat of cyberterrorism: individuals with no moral restraint may 
potentially use methods similar to those developed by hackers to wreak havoc. Moreover, the 
line between cyberterrorism and hacking or hacktivism may sometimes blur, especially if 
terrorist groups are able to recruit or hire computer-savvy hacktivists or if hacktivists decide 
to escalate their actions by attacking the systems that operate critical elements of the national 
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infrastructure, such as electric power networks and emergency services. 
Why are hackers seen as threatening, and why are they often associated with 
terrorism? Because hackers themselves like to exaggerate their abilities. Douglas Thomas, a 
professor at the University of Southern California, spent seven years studying computer 
hackers in an effort to understand better who they are and what motivates them. According to 
Thomas, 
Hacking stories make good copy, but they are very rarely accurate, 
tending to exaggerate threats and downplay the realities of the event. There is 
a big difference between hacking into NASA’s central control system (which 
has not happened) and hacking into the server that hosts their web page 
(which has happened repeatedly). Most media reports fail to distinguish 
between the two (or to explain that hacking a web page is essentially the same 
as spray painting a billboard, posing very little actual risk).
42
 
 
How real is the threat of cyberterrorism? Cyberterrorism conjures up images of 
vicious terrorists unleashing catastrophic attacks against computer networks, wreaking havoc, 
and paralyzing nations. This is a frightening scenario—but how likely is it to occur? Could 
terrorists cripple critical military, financial, and service computer systems? The vulnerability 
of the energy industry is at the heart of Black Ice: The Invisible Threat of Cyber-Terror, in 
which Verton, a former intelligence officer, argues that America’s energy sector would be the 
first domino to fall in a strategic cyberterrorist attack against the United States.
43
 Verton 
explores in frightening detail how the impact of such an attack could rival, or even exceed, 
the consequences of a more traditional physical attack. He claims that during any given year, 
the average, large, utility company experiences about one million cyberintrusions that require 
investigation to ensure that critical system components have not been compromised. 
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Amid all the dire warnings and alarming statistics that the cyberterrorism generates, it 
is important to remember one simple statistic: so far, there have been no recorded instance of 
a terrorist cyberattack on U.S. public facilities, transportation systems, nuclear power plants, 
power grids, or other key components of the national infrastructure. Cyberattacks are 
common, but they have not been conducted by terrorists, and they have not sought to inflict 
the kind of damage that would qualify them as cyberterrorism. As Joshua Green reports in 
The Myth of Cyberterrorism, ―When U.S. troops recovered al Qaeda laptops in Afghanistan, 
officials were surprised to find its members more technologically adept than previously 
believed.‖44 Officials discovered structural and engineering software, electronic models of a 
dam, and information on computerized water systems, nuclear power plants, and U.S. and 
European stadiums. But the evidence uncovered did not suggest that al Qaeda operatives 
were planning cyberattacks, only that they were using the Internet to communicate and 
coordinate physical attacks. Neither al Qaeda nor any other terrorist organization has tried to 
stage a serious cyberattack.  
As Denning concludes, ―At least for now, hijacked vehicles, truck bombs, and 
biological weapons seem to pose a greater threat than cyber terrorism. However, just as the 
events of September 11 caught us by surprise, so could a major cyber assault. We cannot 
afford to shrug off the threat.‖45 There is growing evidence that modern terrorists seriously 
consider adding cyberterrorism to their arsenal. Verton, for example, argues that ―al Qaeda 
has shown itself to have an incessant appetite for modern technology,‖ and provides 
numerous quotes from bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders that show their recognition of 
this new cyberweapon.
46
 Paradoxically, success in the war on terror is likely to make 
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terrorists turn increasingly to unconventional weapons such as cyberterrorism.  
Future terrorists may indeed find more possibilities for cyberterrorism than do the 
terrorists of today. Furthermore, the next generation of terrorists are now growing up in a 
digital world, one in which hacking tools are sure to become more powerful, simpler to use, 
and easier to access.
47
 The notion of ―coupled‖ attacks, or of the use of ―magnifiers‖ 
(combining conventional strikes and cyberattacks) is most alarming  For instance, a terrorist 
group might simultaneously explode a bomb at a train station and launch a cyberattack on the 
communications infrastructure, thus compounding the destructive impact of the event. The 
challenge before us is to assess what needs to be done to address this ambiguous but potential 
threat of cyberterrorism, but to do so without inflating its real significance and without 
manipulating the fear it inspires. 
The Challenge: Online Counterterrorism 
Counterterrorism on the Internet certainly lingers behind the terrorists’ manipulative 
use of this medium. Given the growth of Internet research in recent years, it is rather 
surprising that research of online countermeasures has been overlooked or at least has not 
provided efficient strategy, fruitful devices, or tactics. Several factors combine to explain this 
gap: ―(a) difficulties in tracking and tracing cyber communications, (b) the lack of globally-
accepted processes and procedures for the investigation and prevention of cyber[terrorism], 
and (c) inadequate or ineffective information sharing systems between the public and private 
sectors,‖ between governments, and between counterterrorism agencies.48 
But the technological reasons for the lack of online countermeasures are marginal 
when compared with the legal problems. Responding to terrorist web sites is an extremely 
sensitive and delicate issue, because most of the rhetoric disseminated on the Internet is 
                                                 
47
 ROGAN, supra note 26, at 32. 
48
 Jody R. Westby, Countering Terrorism with Cyber Security, 47 JURIMETRICS 297, 297–300 (2007). 
 29 
considered protected speech under the First Amendment. The case of ―Carnivore‖ may 
illustrate the problematic state of online countermeasures. In February 1998, Attorney 
General Janet Reno unveiled plans to establish a new FBI command center to fight 
cyberattacks on the nation’s critical computer networks. In October 2001, the U.S. House of 
Representatives approved an antiterrorism bill that gave law enforcement officials expanded 
surveillance powers to monitor Internet behavior and email. After the September 11 attacks, 
FBI agents were already visiting the offices of Internet service providers (ISPs), network 
providers, and email vendors around the country in search of those who perpetrated the 
attacks. The FBI used the controversial e-mail surveillance system ―Carnivore‖ to conduct 
those investigations. The system forces ISPs to attach a black box, essentially a powerful 
computer running specialized software, to their networks, through which all of the ISPs’ 
subscribers’ communications flow. In traditional wiretaps, the government is required to 
minimize its interception of non-incriminating or innocent communications, but ―Carnivore‖ 
does just the opposite, by scanning through tens of millions of e-mails and other 
communications from innocent Internet users as well as those targeted suspects. ISP networks 
being subjected to Carnivore is like telephone companies being forced to give the FBI access 
to all calls on its network when the FBI has permission only to seek calls for one subscriber. 
―Carnivore‖ can be configured to do one of several things. It can record all of the e-mail 
messages sent to and from a specific e-mail account. It can record all of the network traffic to 
and from a specific IP address. It can record all of the email headers (i.e., TO and FROM 
addresses) sent to and from a specific email account. It can record all of the servers, 
webpages, or FTP files visited by a particular IP address. Finally, it can track all users who 
access a particular webpage or FTP file. When the FBI’s use of ―Carnivore‖ was revealed in 
July 2000, members of Congress expressed concern, and stated their intent to examine the 
issues and draft appropriate legislation. Because ―Carnivore‖ provides the FBI with access to 
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communications of all monitored ISP subscribers, not just those of the court-designated 
target, it raises substantial privacy issues for millions of Internet users. 
The virtual war between terrorists and counterterrorism forces and agencies is 
certainly vital, dynamic, and ferocious. The National Security Agency, the CIA, the FBI, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, other U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies, and some private 
contractors, are fighting back by cracking terrorist passwords, monitoring suspicious web 
sites, cyberattacking other sites, and planting bogus information. However, there could be 
better ways to counter the threat: ―The government efforts are inadequate. The private sector 
is doing a better job than the government. Our enemies have embraced the Internet. We have 
to ask how closely the government is monitoring it.‖49 
This is not the place to discuss a definitive answer to terrorist exploitation of the 
Internet, but two conclusions are to be stated. First, we must become better informed about 
the uses to which terrorists put the Internet, and we must become better able to monitor their 
activities. ―Journalists, scholars, policymakers, and even security agencies have tended to 
focus on the exaggerated threat of cyberterrorism and paid insufficient attention to the more 
routine uses made of the Internet.‖50 Those uses are numerous, and from the terrorists’ 
perspective, invaluable. Hence, it is imperative that security agencies continue to improve 
their ability to study and to monitor terrorist activities on the Internet, and to explore 
measures to limit the usability of this medium by modern terrorists.  
Second, while clearly we must better defend our societies against terrorism, in the 
process, we must not erode the very qualities and values that make our societies worth 
defending. The Internet is in many ways an almost perfect embodiment of the democratic 
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ideals of free speech and open communication; it is a marketplace of ideas unlike any 
marketplace that has existed before. Unfortunately, the freedom offered by the Internet is 
vulnerable to abuse from groups that, paradoxically, are themselves often hostile to 
uncensored thought and expression. But, if fearful of further terrorist attacks, we 
circumscribe our own freedom to use the Internet, then hand the terrorists a victory, and deal 
democracy a blow. The use of advanced techniques to monitor, search, track, and analyze 
communications carries inherent dangers. Although such technologies might prove very 
helpful in the fight against cyberterrorism and against Internet-savvy terrorists, they might 
also hand  governments—especially authoritarian governments and agencies with little public 
accountability—tools with which to violate civil liberties domestically and abroad. It does not 
take much imagination to recognize that the long-term implications of giving governments 
these tools could be profound and damaging for democracies and their values and could add a 
heavy price in terms of diminished civil liberties to the high toll exacted by terrorism itself. 
